NBC CAPABILITIES, Iran

NBC CAPABILITIES, Iran

Report Date: 19-Aug-2005

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense

Iran's policy towards the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) remains ambivalent. It participates in the majority of treaties and conventions that seek to prevent proliferation, while at the same time being strongly suspected of a clandestine programme. In fact, some of the commentary by Iranian government spokesmen over the last three years has done little to allay these suspicions. The election on 24 June 2005 of the new president, Mahmood Ahmedi-Nejad, has led quickly to a hardening of the Tehran government's attitude towards the West. All the indications are that Iran does seek to develop a nuclear-weapons capability, and the perception of this intention by the US and by some EU members continues to drive their foreign-policy relations with Iran.

The Iranian desire for a nuclear capability is twofold:

Prestige. With the turmoil in Iraq, Iran now sees itself as the natural regional power, and a nuclear capability appears to be prestigious, popular and attractive to nationalist elements in Iranian society. Tehran observes how other key powers in the region, such as Israel, India and Pakistan, have been able to exert more political leverage than otherwise through nuclear ownership.
Security. Iran acknowledges the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons and believes such a capability would allow it to deter potential military aggression by its neighbors and their supporters. Implacably opposed to the existence of Israel and fearful of US intervention, Iran would find itself in a strong position if it could include the nuclear option in its armory.

In 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintained its pressure on Iran to cease its suspected uranium-enrichment programme. The US remains keen to impose sanctions on Iran, as it contends that the government is intent on pursuing a nuclear-weapons capability as a clandestine activity, beyond the reach of the agreed inspection regime. The signals emerging from Iran are increasingly belligerent, following the US's inauguration in January 2005 of the second presidential term of George W Bush. The heightened rhetoric was triggered by a statement from the US Secretary of State, Dr Condoleeza Rice. In testimony to her confirmation hearing, on 19 January 2005, she described Iran and North Korea as "outposts of tyranny". By way of response, Hasan Rohani, Iran's chief negotiator, reaffirmed that his country's reluctant agreement to suspend uranium enrichment was "temporary" for a few months while negotiations continued to achieve a compromise deal with the UK, France and Germany (the so-called E3) to assist with peaceful nuclear development in exchange for a full suspension. After extremely rocky progress, the negotiations appear to have all but failed, and on 9 August 2005, the Iranian government unilaterally declared that it would remove the seals on the second and third stages of the facility at Isfahan and allow the uranium-conversion process to recommence. The IAEA finds itself in a difficult position, as this step - although seen as escalatory, especially by the US - is not, in fact, illegal. The IAEA would have preferred the Iranians to have waited beyond their unilaterally declared deadline to allow inspectors to install planned safeguards (video cameras and so on) to verify compliance with the rules. The agency remains highly suspicious about Iran's intentions, based on previous hard evidence that Iran had been conducting a clandestine development programme.

Should agreement fail, leading to a recommencement not only of conversion but also of enrichment, it becomes highly likely that the US, having publicly declared that enrichment is unacceptable, would act. This, initially, would involve pressure for sanctions against Iran. To achieve UN Security Council agreement on tough, effective sanctions would be extremely difficult, and, given the Iranian government's track record, weak sanctions are likely to be ineffective. In any case, sanctions would almost certainly see Iran withdraw from the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), which Iran had ratified in 1970. Also, Iran could impose sea control over the eastern side of the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, threatening Gulf oil supplies to the West. In addition, the West is dependent on Iran's oil (Iran is the world's second-largest supplier, after Saudi Arabia), and sanctions against Iran would therefore be tough on the West as well as on Iran. In this case, the prospect of military action becomes more likely, causing a significant but unpredictable impact on regional stability.

In 2003, the crisis over Iran's nuclear-weapons programme centered on three main events:

The signing of the IAEA Additional Protocol
The agreement by Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and centrifuge assembly
The discovery of an international supply chain of enrichment equipment and bomb designs from which Iran benefited in the 1980s and the 1990s.

The Iranian government publicly and officially declares all WMDs as fundamentally anti-Islamic and has been careful to ratify treaties on the control of WMDs.

Iran insists that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes. By September 2003, pressure by the US, the UN, the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation increased on Iran to sign an Additional Protocol to the NNPT to allow the IAEA short-notice access to nuclear sites. Iran insisted that the international community should allow Iran access to technology for its civilian nuclear programme.

In October 2003, Tehran agreed to sign the Additional Protocol and to provide an account of all its nuclear-related activities and to suspend its controversial uranium-enrichment programme.

This climb-down reflected the joint policies of the EU 'carrot' of economic incentives and the US 'stick' of military action, as witnessed in neighboring Iraq. Iran accepted the risk of international isolation and recognized that the EU would align with the US in its tough demands. Iran would face sanctions if it declared in violation of the NNPT. Washington had hoped to push the IAEA to declare Iran in "non-compliance" with its obligations under the NNPT. Iran had said it would not honor any of the new commitments if the international community were too demanding. US officials said that the Bush administration would not seek to refer the matter to the UN Security Council, but during 2003, Iranian delaying tactics continued over more intrusive inspections, argument over the draft terms of the Additional Protocol and claims that their promise to sign it depended on arrangements worked out with visiting European foreign ministers. It included lengthy discussions over what should constitute a 'trigger' mechanism for UN action on Iranian violations of international nuclear obligations.

A 2003 US National Intelligence Estimate stated that Iran could produce a nuclear weapon well before the end of the decade. Iran dismissed claims of weapon development as US paranoia and as a justification for Western arms sales to the Gulf states, where defense expenditure is far greater than in Iran. Iran's desire to control and protect the uranium fuel cycle is aimed at independence from foreign supply in its nuclear domestic electricity-generation target of 6,000 MW. As an example, the Bushehr site is well fortified with anti-air defenses.

Iran's economic position remains weak, and government officials say that their priority, far from clandestine weapon acquisition, is the repair of the country's ravaged infrastructure and the development of the domestic economy. A period of instability could follow the 2004 elections, in which conservative Islamic candidates once again became the dominant political force. These conservatives are more likely to favor continuing a nuclear-weapons programme. Hardliners have said that IAEA inspections were tantamount to allowing spies into the country.

Much depends on whether Iran will continue to keep its enrichment and reprocessing facilities suspended or whether it will seek to revive them once the safeguard issues have been resolved.

IAEA Chief Inspector Mohamed El-Baradei said in December 2003 that Iran's signature of the Additional Protocol was "an important building block toward establishing confidence that Iran's programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes". However, though the agreement reached between the US and the three EU countries marks significant progress, the crisis over Iran's nuclear programme is not over. The IAEA can, however, demand much more information about sensitive nuclear activities now and may inspect all declared and undeclared nuclear sites with as little as two hours' notice.

Questions remain about whether Iran's admission about its past nuclear activities was accurate, and it will take the IAEA several months to investigate and determine whether Iran has finally told the truth about its previous - and current - nuclear activities.

Nuclear weapons

When Mohamed El-Baradei visited the Natanz centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility for the first time in February 2003, he commented on how "comprehensive and sophisticated" the facility was. The plant was much further advanced than had previously been believed. In March 2003, El-Baradei demanded that Iran accept closer inspection of nuclear-related installations.

The IAEA gave Iran a 31 October 2003 deadline to hand over a complete and accurate history of its nuclear programme. The declaration, which Tehran submitted on 23 October, showed that it had previously failed to comply with the NNPT.

Tehran stated said that it had been forced to be "discreet" about many of its nuclear activities because of decades of sanctions. It said that its failures to inform the IAEA of its activities were all in the past and that it had since declared all activities and facilities to the UN inspectors.

The IAEA's November 2003 report ascertained that Iran had produced small amounts of enriched uranium and plutonium, and it faulted Iran for not telling the truth in the past about its nuclear programme. Much to the annoyance of Washington, it credited Iran for a change of heart since September, when the agency demanded it explain contradictions and ambiguities in its nuclear activities. These had included an 18-year-long development of a uranium-centrifuge programme and a 12-year laser enrichment programme, which is a less reliable technology (Iraq also tried it in the 1980s, without success).

Following days of backroom negotiations with France, Germany and the UK, on 24 February 2004 Iran agreed to expand its suspension of its uranium-enrichment activities, including centrifuge assembly. This appeared to resolve the dispute that resulted from Iran's original announcement in late 2003 that it would not enrich any uranium but would continue to assemble centrifuge equipment.

However, this is no guarantee against future resumption. IAEA inspections remain an imperfect mechanism for monitoring clandestine weapons programmes, and experts are divided as to the value of these visits.

The IAEA's discoveries

The IAEA found traces of weapons-grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) in environmental samples taken from around the Natanz pilot plant. Iran has claimed that these were the result of contamination from enrichment centrifuges bought abroad on the black market during the 1980s and insisted that it did not know which countries supplied them because they were bought from intermediaries who can no longer be traced.

The IAEA first determined that the Russian Federation, China and Pakistan were the sources of equipment. This and subsequent inspections of the Natanz plant revealed a vast network of suppliers of centrifuge components and technology, headed by the maverick nuclear scientist A Q Khan, 'father' of the Pakistani bomb. In January 2004, Khan admitted to having provided Iran, Libya and North Korea with blueprints and components for uranium-enrichment equipment. Iran benefited from this trade between 1989 and 1991. The IAEA's discoveries appear to support US claims that Iran is pursuing its programme covertly, by procurement through false trading companies.

In February 2004, Iran acknowledged that it had covertly purchased components for its nuclear programme on the international nuclear black market. Tehran also provided the IAEA with the names of five European middlemen and six Pakistani scientists involved.

The IAEA found undeclared components of the P-2 uranium-enrichment centrifuge at the Doshan-Tappeh air base in Tehran. The P-2 is a more advanced type than the model Iran has acknowledged using. It is called P-2 because it is a Pakistani version of the advanced Western G-2 design. According to the IAEA's February 2004 report on Iran's nuclear activities, Iranian officials admitted that Tehran in 1994 obtained foreign designs for P-2 centrifuges and subsequently tested some components based on the designs. This admission had not been mentioned in Iran's 21 October 2003 letter to the agency that Tehran has claimed provided a complete picture of Iran's previously secret nuclear activities.

The P-2 centrifuge programme was only one of several areas where the IAEA indicated Iran has fallen short of admitting previous activities. Iran did not declare designs for the advanced P-2 centrifuge. The IAEA discovered that the P-2 technology was very similar to that supplied by Khan's network to Libya and was largely obtained from the same sources. The P-1 or G-1 is probably enough for a civilian programme where the uranium is needed to be enriched for nuclear fuel; however, using G-2 or P-2 centrifuges could point to a military programme.

Iran also still has to provide "clarification" about its activities related to the radioisotope polonium-210 (Po²¹⁰), which is used to facilitate the timing of a nuclear explosion and traces of which the IAEA discovered in September 2003. The Iranians admitted to using it for previously undisclosed experiments. Although it has some industrial uses, polonium's prime use is, in conjunction with beryllium, in a nuclear weapon's neutron initiator, which sits in the core of the weapon and ensures that the chain reaction leading to the nuclear explosion is initiated at the correct moment. Use of polonium would always alert nuclear observers, as would equipment and components, the locations in Iran to which such equipment and components were moved and the associated details of time scales and the names of individuals involved.

Other items that Iran failed to disclose included the following:

testing conducted at Kalaye Electric of centrifuges from 1999 to 2002, using 1.9 kg of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) that had been imported from China in 1991
the importation of natural uranium metal in 1994 and use of that material in its laser-enrichment programme
laboratory-scale experiments with uranium conversion processes at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) from 1981 to 1993
the extraction of gram quantities of plutonium in experiments at the TNRC from 1988 to 1992 without informing the IAEA. The plutonium was extracted from depleted uranium oxide targets that had been irradiated in the Tehran Research Reactor.

Natanz

Iran did not provide timely information on uranium-enrichment activities at its Natanz pilot-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plant. Environmental samples taken by IAEA at the plant show the presence of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), which Iranian officials said came from contaminated equipment purchased from "abroad". Iran subsequently admitted that previous centrifuge rotor tests had been conducted at the Amir Khabir University and at the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). In March 2003, UN inspectors had concluded that the Natanz facility contained 160 recently built centrifuges. According to the Washington Post, Iran is in the process of building 1,000 more, with an end goal of 5,000 in 2005. Whether this timeline has been maintained is hard to verify. The US suspects that much of the activity may have been located underground.

It is possible that construction of the Natanz plant violated Iran's IAEA safeguards obligations. Such a violation would have occurred if Iran introduced nuclear material into the facility to test it, without informing the IAEA.

Satellite images obtained in 2002 had shown enrichment facilities as well as heavy-water production. They showed that structures at Natanz were being covered with earth, leading US intelligence to suspect that Tehran was building "a secret underground site where it could produce fissile material".

Although the pilot plant is relatively small, it could produce as much as 10-12 kg of weapons-grade uranium a year, depending on the efficiency and design of the centrifuge cascades. Even if the cascades are arranged to produce only lowly enriched uranium, they can produce weapons-grade uranium by recycling the end product back into the feed point of the cascade until the required level of enrichment is reached.

It is estimated that by the end of 2005, this plant could produce 15-20 kg of weapons-grade uranium, enough for a nuclear weapon. According to the IAEA safeguards report, Iran plans to start installing up to 50,000 centrifuges in the main enrichment halls of the Natanz facility in 2005, after testing and confirming its centrifuge design in the pilot plant. The eventual capacity would be sufficient to produce about 500 kg of weapons-grade uranium annually, enough for roughly 25-30 nuclear weapons per year.

Kalaye

In September 2003, the IAEA found traces of HEU at a second site - a previously undisclosed facility in Tehran called Kalaye Electric. Samples taken from one room at Kalaye showed the presence of uranium enriched to 25 times the level previously acknowledged by Iran. In June 2003, Iran had prohibited IAEA inspectors from taking environmental samples at the Kalaye plant. Research and development work on the uranium-enrichment gas centrifuge programme has taken place at Kalaye Electric. The Iranians imported 1.9 kg of UF₆ gas from China to test four centrifuges at Kalaye Electric in preparation for starting up the larger centrifuge pilot plant at Natanz.

Bushehr

Until the revelations about Natanz and other sites, the intelligence focus was on the 1,000 MW Bushehr light-water reactor project. Iran's first nuclear power plant, built with Russian Federation help, is scheduled to power the Iranian national grid in 2006, with 90 tonnes of fuel ready to be shipped. Washington has been trying to persuade Moscow to freeze its $800 million deal with Iran to build Bushehr, and Moscow has prodded Tehran to accept tighter IAEA controls.

Iran maintains that the enriched uranium for Bushehr could not be used in nuclear weapons, and that all spent fuel from the reactor would be returned to Russia. Moscow claims that spent fuel will be stored in Iran for three years to allow it to cool before shipping it to a Russian storage site. However, it would not be difficult to reprocess the spent fuel and isolate the plutonium. Iran has previously tried to import technologies to separate plutonium from spent fuel rods. As of 1 March 2004, Russian and Iranian officials were still to agree on whether Iran will send spent fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant back to Russia. Moscow said it would not begin delivering fuel for the reactor until an agreement is signed on this issue. It claimed that the delivery of fuel is constantly being delayed because Iran has no final document on a reaction to a possible emergency.

Arak

A June 2003 IAEA report revealed that Iran was building a previously unacknowledged heavy-water research reactor at Arak. A letter sent by Iran to the IAEA in May 2003 informed the agency for the first time of its intention to construct it.

The Iranian heavy-water reactor programme consists of the heavy-water (deuterium oxide) production plant nearing construction at Arak and the planned 40 MW IR-40, to be built at Arak.

The National Council of Resistance (NCR) of Iran first revealed the existence of a secret nuclear facility at Arak in 2002. A likely choice for Iran's future nuclear programme would be secretly to build a research-sized heavy-water reactor for producing spent fuel with a high plutonium content. The Arak heavy-water plant makes sense only if it is paired with a plutonium production reactor, which was not disclosed. The construction of such a reactor raised questions about Iran's intentions, as heavy-water reactors produce more plutonium in their spent fuel than light-water reactors. Iran's only nuclear-power reactor expected to become operational within the next decade is the Bushehr light-water reactor.

Heavy-water reactors can also burn natural uranium fuel, obviating the need for the costly and challenging process of creating clandestine uranium-enrichment facilities. Standard light-water reactors have to use enriched uranium fuel which then requires processing to extract the plutonium. Indeed, Pakistan's creation of a nuclear capability followed this path. It revealed the existence of a heavy-water reactor at Khushab in 1988, prior to its nuclear-warhead tests. The Khushab reactor, with a capacity of about 50 MW, uses natural uranium fuel and is heavy-water cooled and moderated. It consumes an estimated 40 tonnes of heavy water and is capable of producing enough plutonium for several nuclear warheads a year.

Iran claims that the heavy-water reactor will be used for medical and industrial isotope production and for research and development. But these purposes could be served by a 10 MW reactor, whereas the planned Arak facility is a 40 MW reactor. And if it is making isotopes, the country would do better to use enriched uranium than the natural uranium planned for Arak.

In September 2003, the IAEA asked Iran to explain why it had not declared plans to acquire "hot cells" for handling highly radioactive material at the Arak heavy-water reactor. The absence of hot cells from design plans Iran submitted to the agency in August is contrary to what would be expected, given the radioisotope-production stated purposes of the facility.

During their visit in July 2003, IAEA inspectors were provided with drawings of the IR-40. The agency raised the hot-cells issue during that visit, particularly in light of open source reports of recent efforts by Iran to acquire from abroad heavy manipulators and leaded windows designed for hot-cell applications. The inconsistencies inherent in Iran 's description of the heavy-water reactor, while not damning in isolation, constitute an important plank in the case against Iran.

Iran told the IAEA in August 2004 that it decided 20 years ago to begin heavy-water research and development and conducted laboratory experiments in the mid-1980s, finally deciding in the mid-1990s to build a reactor.

In February 2002, Iran announced that it had discovered and had begun mining uranium for the first time and was building facilities to process ore into fuel for nuclear-power plants. This would give the country independent access to fissile material. Iran aims to use a new network of facilities to achieve self-sufficiency in the supply of nuclear fuel and to become less reliant on the Russian Federation, which is vulnerable to US pressure.

Isfahan

In May 2003, Iran informed the IAEA for the first time of its plan to construct a Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Isfahan, some 350 km south of Tehran. The stated purpose of the FMP is to fabricate fuel assemblies for Bushehr and to manufacture nuclear fuel for the reactor. The Isfahan plant is expected to begin operations in 2007. The plant, which is at Iran's largest nuclear research centre, employing as many as 3,000 scientists, would process uranium from nearby mines, and UF₆ gas would be enriched at Natanz. Iran had introduced UF₆ into some centrifuges at an undisclosed location to test their capability, thereby violating the terms of the NNPT.

Historical development

Mohammad Mohaddessin of the NCR Foreign Affairs Committee claims that the Iranian nuclear programme began in 1985, when an embryonic development by the Shah, abandoned six years previously, was reactivated. However, it is possible that evidence from resistance groups could be self-serving and unreliable.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is responsible for overseeing military nuclear developments, and Mohaddessin claims that the transfer of dual-use technologies from Argentina, China, France and Pakistan has assisted the development programme. In 1992, Tehran signed a civilian nuclear-power agreement with the Russian Federation to assist in the development of two 40 MW reactors. Apparently, a calutron-type uranium-enrichment plant has been obtained from China. Other projects and facilities include these:

Bandar Abbas project: the integration of nuclear systems with ballistic missiles
Bushehr project: a facility damaged in the Iran-Iraq War and currently under reconstruction, jointly by the Russian Federation and Iran
Darkhovin site (also known as Ahvaz or Darkouin): the country's dual-purpose nuclear site in southern Iran, 55 km northeast of Abadan; construction commenced with Chinese assistance, but the project has now been cancelled
Gorgan project: located on the shores of the Caspian Sea, where the Soviet Union agreed to construct two VVER-440 reactors at an unspecified site, later identified as Gorgan; there is no evidence that the Russian Federation has revived the project
Isfahan project: the centre of the nuclear industry, with its own reactor and a Chinese neutron-sparker, the site includes underground facilities
GAMA Energy Centre: located in northeastern Iran, at Banab; no further details are available
Moalem Kelayeh project: located at Qazvin, 120 km northwest of Tehran; uses no foreign expertise so as to keep its purpose secret
Yazd project: built underground close to a uranium extraction site in 1989-90; its purpose is unknown
Chalus: reportedly the mountain site of an underground nuclear-weapons development facility
Rudan Nuclear Research Centre in Fasa, near Shiraz: reportedly the location of uranium yellowcake processing into UF6 gas; China may have built this plant as part of a secret nuclear co-operation agreement signed in 1991.

Large numbers of Iranian students currently study nuclear physics in West European universities at postgraduate level. However, the assistance provided by A Q Khan in Iran's nuclear programme could well have sidestepped the long process of gaining the relevant expertise.

Western analysts contend that if Iran acquired WMDs and the means to deliver them, it would pose a significant threat to regional stability. A nuclear-equipped Iran may seek to reverse the Saudi and Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) policy of cheap oil and perhaps seek revenge on Saudi and Gulf Arabs for their support of Iraq in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.

Biological weapons

The Iranian resistance group the Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) made more drastic accusations about Iran's biological weapons programme in May 2003. The MKO, which is listed as a terrorist group by Washington but has allies in the US Congress, alleged that Tehran had started producing weaponised anthrax and was actively working with at least five other pathogens, including smallpox. While previous US assessments have made the assumption that Iran had the research capacity for BW, the MKO report went further in saying that Iran is actively producing a BW stockpile.

The UN contends that Iran has yet to develop a serious BW production capability, but the NCR of Iran has said that university sites such as the Imam Reza Medical Centre at Mashhad University and the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology are involved in BW-related science. The Pasteur Institute of Iran is a centre of biological expertise, which officially conducts applied research on basic medical health sciences and disease control, and produces biological products and laboratory reagents. With well-developed departments of virology and molecular biology, it is engaged in transgenic plant research and the production of enzymes using genetic engineering. These techniques are in the forefront of research into novel bio-weapons that could be resistant to all known drugs and vaccines, as well as being able to defeat current BW detection methods.

Razi is the government's serum and vaccine production centre to the northwest of Karaj, on the Qazvin-Hessarak road. Swiss, German, Italian and Spanish companies have all provided Iran with components essential to an offensive BW programme. Such facilities that are researching vaccines for either medical purposes or BW defense purposes could be adapted for military programmes.

Chemical weapons

While nuclear developments have taken precedence, US authorities are persisting with their claim that Iran already has stocks of up to 2,000 tonnes of weaponised CW agent, including choking, blister and blood agents, and has also produced the nerve agent sarin. In May 2003, the US told the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that Iran was continuing to seek chemicals, production technology, training and expertise from abroad.

Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November 1997 and fervently denies acquiring or producing CW. It employed CW against Iraq in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War in retaliation against Iraqi CW attacks. Its war-fighting experience with CW will have strongly influenced defense planning, as it has in Iraq.

Iran's CW production capabilities appear to be well dispersed, with some CW-agent production taking place within secure Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics facilities. Estahan Chemical is cited as one of Iran's main CW facilities. Other suspected CW sites include Bandar-Khomeini, a chemical production complex in southwestern Iran, and the Marvdasht Centre in Fars province, a mustard-gas production facility set up during the Iran-Iraq War to produce CW for the battlefield.

China has been an important supplier of technologies and equipment for Iran's CW programme. In May 1997, the US government imposed trade sanctions on five Chinese individuals, two Chinese companies and one Hong Kong company, for knowingly and materially contributing to the programme. The NCR of Iran claims that, using technology gleaned from various sources in China, Germany and North Korea, the IRGC, which appears to have control of strategic weapons, can adapt chemical warheads for the country's ballistic missiles of the SCUD family. Iran is also developing a medium-range ballistic missile, based on a North Korean design, that would be capable of striking Israel. The US and Israel have jointly voiced concern over Iran's missile programme and have urged countries such as China to stop arms co-operation with Iran. The government department responsible for all chemical development facilities is the Engineering Research Centre of the Construction Crusade (Jahad-e-Sazandegi). Facilities include these:

Bandar-Khomeini: This chemical production complex in the southwest of Iran was set up during the Iran-Iraq War to provide chemical agents for the battlefield. It is managed by the Razi Chemical Corporation, which, although co-located with the Petrochemical Industries Establishment of the Oil Ministry, is nevertheless independent.
Isfahan: About 45 km from the city of Isfahan, the Poly-Acryl Corporation's commercial plant has been developed into a major chemical-weapons production facility.
Karaj programme: This is a chemical-weapons site about 14 km from Tehran, in the direction of Karaj; Mohammad Mohaddessin claims that Chinese engineers and technicians have been involved in the site's development.
Marvdasht Centre: This was the mustard-gas production facility for the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War, situated in Fars province.

German intelligence reports show that Iran was in possession of the blueprint used to build the Rabta chemical arms plant in Libya.

Assessment

The US-led coalition military campaign to remove Saddam Hussein from control in Iraq, combined with economic incentives and diplomatic persuasion by the EU, have had the result that Iran has partially caved in to demands to disclose details of past and present nuclear developments and to suspend enrichment of uranium. However, the series of previously undisclosed processes and facilities, revelations of black-market suppliers of enrichment equipment, and Iran's delaying tactics over the Additional Protocol and other agreements have aroused further suspicions about Iran's true intentions.

The revelations about the nuclear network operated by A Q Khan has exposed Iran to ever-more-damaging disclosures of its attempts to hide nuclear-related facilities. They have added weight to the US accusations that Iran has concealed the true purpose of these facilities. The discovery of the P-2 centrifuge components at an Iranian air-force base creates a feasible link between Iran's nuclear programme and the military, despite Tehran's claims that nuclear facilities are entirely civilian and are designed to generate electricity. Mohammed El-Baradei has said that Iran's declaration in 2003 that it had revealed all was untrue. The IAEA's February 2004 report points to several key omissions or deceptions, increasing the suspicion that Tehran remains bent on becoming a nuclear power.

Under pressure from the IAEA, Iran was repeatedly forced to change its story several times in 2004. Under the agreement brokered by the EU in October 2003, Iran admitted to violations over 18 years. In return, it was spared a referral to the UN Security Council. However, the US could seize on the IAEA's findings to demand that Iran be referred to the Security Council for possible sanctions.

That Iran had made small "laboratory-scale" quantities of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium opened up the possibility that it had set off on two possible routes to a nuclear weapon. The differences between the various traces of weapons-grade uranium found by the inspectors in Iran cannot be explained by the Iranian version of events.

Of considerable significance is the discovery that Iran has been experimenting with the production of Po²¹⁰, a radioactive isotope which is specifically used in initiators to trigger a nuclear explosion. Polonium's civilian uses are limited, and Tehran is unable to provide records or other evidence to support its explanation.

The report also says that Iran has been testing a much more advanced model of uranium centrifuge - the P-2s - than had previously been admitted. Iran's explanation when found out was "difficult to comprehend".

Israel, which destroyed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear plant in 1981, is deeply alarmed by Iran’s WMD development, especially in the light of Iran's principal sponsorship of Hizbullah. Israel, while maintaining an 'Osirak option', will continue to press diplomatically for a reversal. The situation has also pitted Washington directly against Moscow, as the breadth of Russian help for Iran's programme becomes apparent, despite US warnings. The US continues to make its concerns clear to the Russian Federation about the Bushehr project.

The IAEA's revelations came at a time when the US attention was focused on Iraq and, more recently, on North Korea. Critics of the US administration say that President Bush's hard public line against the so-called 'axis of evil', combined with his stance on Iraq, had acted as a spur to both Iran and North Korea to accelerate their nuclear programmes.

When Iran eventually agreed to suspend centrifuge assembly, having reluctantly agreed to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities, it did not promise to halt all domestic production of components but said that any new parts would be placed under IAEA seal.

The US has publicly identified Iran as being active in offensive WMD development. It is hard to assess progress on the BW front, although Iran's CW capability appears well advanced. Having shown little enthusiasm for the IAEA's operations, the Bush administration praised the toughness of its February 2004 report. In the words of one US official: "Iran's hand was caught in the cookie jar."

The victory of the conservative hardliners in the February 2004 Iran elections led to a renewed intransigence from Iran about its nuclear ambitions. Now that it has signed up to the Additional Protocol, more scrutiny of its facilities would restrict these ambitions. The incriminating nature of the IAEA February 2004 report ensured that Iran would face continued skepticism about its insistence that its nuclear facilities are for civilian purposes only. Any hope in Tehran that the country would soon be freed from IAEA requests for close scrutiny has gone for the foreseeable future. There are no guarantees that Iran will totally abandon its nuclear-weapons ambitions.