Iranian Army

Summary           

STRENGTH 345,000 INFANTRY Division × 6 ARMOUR Division × 4 ARTILLERY Regiment × 5 SPECIAL FORCES Division × 1 MISSILE FORCES Brigade × 1

Assessment           

During the 1990s there was a notable differentiation in mission between Iran's primary security institutions: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the regular army (Artesh). Despite the drastic economic, political and social conditions in Iran, the country will continue to maintain the two land force components. As economic conditions allow, the regular army will become more technologically based and more mobile, with an ability to sit well behind screen positions, rapidly reinforcing threatened areas where necessary. The IRGC will focus on less traditional defense duties, particularly those that involve unusual missions or capabilities. These duties range from stopping smuggling and controlling Iran's WMD and missile forces, to preparing for closing the Straits of Hormuz. In contrast, the Artesh focuses its efforts on more traditional threats. To that end, the regular army will probably attempt to increase the size of the army aviation force, with an increased emphasis on attack and transport helicopters, both of which it is seeking to manufacture domestically.

Iran's interest in command and control systems continues, a problem that was highlighted in the Iran-Iraq war. If the regular army is to raise its effectiveness there must be a concerted attempt to ensure some commonality of systems. The existing multitude of both Western and ex-Soviet/Russian systems is a significant logistical, training and integration problem, which reduces the overall effectiveness of the force, and it will be difficult to raise standards while this situation prevails. Despite these obstacles, Iranian Army communications have improved, as have Iranian battle management and communications exercises. They are now capable of better co-ordination between branches, the density of communications equipment has improved, and the functional lines of communication and command now place more emphasis on maneuver, quick reaction and combined arms.

However, Iranian battle management and communications capabilities seem to remain relatively limited. Iran's holdings still consist largely of aging VHF radio with some HF and UHF capability. This equipment cannot handle high traffic densities and secure communications are poor. Iran still relies heavily on analogue data handling and manually switched telephone systems. It is, however, acquiring a steadily growing number of Chinese and Western encryption systems and some digital voice, fax, and telex encryption capability. Iran Electronic Industries Company is now designing all types of long-range military transmitters, tactical transmitters, information transmitters, air and marine transmitters, and the production of anti-electronic warfare systems are among the Ministry of Defense’s most recent capabilities. Iran Electronic Industries Company is now designing all types of long-range military transmitters, tactical transmitters, information transmitters, air and marine transmitters, and anti-electronic warfare systems are among the Ministry of Defense newer capabilities.

IRGC and the regular army           

The IRGC plays a major role in internal security; nevertheless it is best to treat the IRGC primarily as a military land force which parallels the Iranian regular army, and which would operate with it in most contingencies. For example, the IRGC adds some 120,000 additional men to Iran's forces. Roughly 100,000 are ground forces, including many conscripts. The IRGC has been placed under an integrated command with Iran's regular armed forces at the General staff level. It retains an independent command chain below this level, however, and generally continues to exercise as an independent force. It rarely exercises with the regular Iranian army - and then usually in large, set piece exercises which do not require close co-operation. Sources differ sharply on the organization of the IRGC, and its combat formations seem to be much smaller than the title implies, and to differ sharply from unit to unit. Some estimates point to strength of two armored, five mechanized, 10 infantry, and one special forces division, plus 15 to 20 independent brigades, including some armed and paratroop units. In practice, its manning would support three-five real divisions, and many of its divisions have an active strength equivalent to large brigades.

Part of the IRGC, the Basij (Mobilization of the Oppressed) is a popular reserve force of about 90,000 men with an active and reserve strength of up to 300,000 and a mobilization capacity of nearly 1,000,000 men. It has up to 740 regional battalions with about 300 to 350 men each, which are composed of three companies or four platoons plus support. These include the former tribal levies, and are largely regional in character. Many have little or no real military training and active full time active manning, however, Iran has used the Basij to provide local security ever since the popular riots of 1994. Since that time, it has begun began far more extensive training for riot control and internal security missions.

It also introduced a formal rank structure, and a more conventional system of command and discipline, and created specialized "Ashura" battalions for internal security missions. The primary mission of the Basij now seems to be internal security, monitoring the activities of Iranian citizens, acting as replacements for the military services, and serving as a static militia force tied to local defense missions. In March 2005, Head of the Basij, Commander Mohammad Hejazi, said that the government would be elevating the combat capability of the Ashura and Al-Zahra units over the course of the year. He said that the decision has been adopted in view of the deterrent role of the Basij force vis-a-vis the threats against the Islamic Republic. Hejazi also said that nine exercises for the Basijis would be held in 2005-2006, and said these included exercises in local resistance, sabotage operations, relief and rescue, countering chemical and biological attacks, and staging provincial combat camps.

The May 1997 election of reformist candidate Mohammad Khatami to the presidency, complicated Iran's command structure and civil-military relations. Though senior IRGC officers had endorsed his conservative opponent (Majlis Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri), credible post-election press reports indicate that IRGC personnel voted for Khatami in even greater proportions than did the general population. This indicates that the IRGC - a military organization long thought to have been a bastion of support for conservative hardliners - is in fact driven by the same divisions as Iranian society, and divided into highly antagonistic reformist and conservative camps.

Prospects           

Despite the bifurcated structure of Iran's army, Tehran's commitment to enhanced military professionalism and better military co-ordination appears secure. Instability along Iran's borders and the formal US military and political presence in the Persian Gulf have increased the premium on Iran maintaining a modern, well-equipped, and efficient army. Iranian leaders have learned through bitter experience that a ramshackle amateur army of volunteers is no match against a modern professional force. The need, therefore, for a well-equipped and drilled army that can respond in a co-ordinated fashion to several challenges simultaneously is accepted by almost all of Iran's leaders.

Iran's security policies in the 1990s reflected these concerns. Iran's rearmament drive of the 1990s required investment in all the services and the import of new military hardware. More important still, to realize its objectives, the regime had to upgrade its relations with the regular armed forces, giving them due recognition and a greater public presence. Military parades have again become commonplace, and senior members of Iran's clerical elite seem to make a habit of attending military rallies and of being seen with military officers. Both the IRGC and the regular army have increased their emphasis on professionalism. They are increasing the technical training offered to soldiers and basing promotion criteria more on education and expertise.

Military "self-reliance" is still the operative goal of the Iranian defense establishment. To that end, Iran has sought to produce its major weapons systems, such as main battle tanks, armored vehicles - such as the Boraq - and heavy artillery.

While in quantitative terms Iran is still a major military power, in recent years Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, have invested far more in procurement and modernization than Iran. As such, a qualitative gap has emerged between Iran's army and those of its neighbors: Iran's armed forces are not equipped with the latest technology and despite a perpetual military modernization campaign, the diversity and age of its inventory is a decided liability. In addition, the combat trained manpower Iran developed during the Iran-Iraq War have virtually all left service. Iran is now a largely conscript force with limited military training and little combat experience. Consequently, their performance in another major conflict is difficult to predict.

Current developments and recent operations           

Role and Deployment           

According to a 1995 plan, 200,000+ regular troops are to be employed as the first line of defense and the regular army will maintain a pool of experts able to operate the 'state-of-the-art equipment' necessary for a modern force to operate effectively. In an emergency, the large numbers of personnel required to create the necessary force size would come from the Basij volunteer force.

Large-scale conscription is seen as wasteful and unnecessary during periods of economic downturn as experienced in 1998-2000. As the system probably could not cope with such numbers during peacetime, conscription is therefore a selective process, some draftees going to the army and others to civilian functions such as the construction industry, health care, teaching and village reconstruction.

Armored divisions

Iran has steadily rebuilt its armored strength since the Iran-Iraq War. Various estimates suggest that Iran's inventory of 1,565 main battle tanks now includes some 150 M-47/M-48 and 150-160 M-60A1, 200 Chieftain Mark 3/5s, 75 T-62s, 400 T-72/T-72S, 250 T-54/T-55, 150-250 T-59s, 50 T-62s, and 150-250 T-69II, and approximately 100 Zulifqars (indigenously produced). Other estimates indicate that Iran may have as many as 300 Type 59s. These totals include the remainder of 187 improved FV4030/1 versions of the Mark 5 Chieftain that were delivered to Iran before the fall of the Shah. Only part of Iran's tank inventory is fully operational, however, and it is uncertain how many Chieftains and M-47/M-48s are in full working order. Some experts estimate that Iran's sustainable operational tank strength may be fewer than 1,000 tanks. Further, its Chieftains and M-60s are at least 16 to 20 years old, and the T-72 is Iran's only tank with advanced fire control systems, sights, and anti-armor ammunition.

Iran's armored warfare doctrine seems to be borrowed from US, British, and Russian sources without achieving any coherent concept of operations. Even so, Iran's armored doctrine is improving more quickly than its organization and exercise performance. Iran's armored forces are very poorly structured, and its equipment pool is dissipated among far too many regular and IRGC units. According to some estimates Iran has only one armored division - the 92nd Armored Division - with enough tanks and other armor to be considered a true armored unit.

Peace Support Operations           

No contributions have been made.

Command and control           

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, which consist of three main components: the regular military; the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or Pasdaran and the law enforcement forces. The regular military and IRGC are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which is headed by Defense Minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani. These organizations are responsible for defending Iran's borders and providing for internal security. The law enforcement forces are formally subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, and play a key internal- and frontier-security role.

Nominally, the president exercises considerable routine authority and controls budget planning. However, the Supreme Leader is the most important authority. Under Article 110 of the 1979 constitution, the Supreme Leader retains the constitutional right to declare war and call for general troop mobilization. He is also the supreme commander of both the IRGC and the regular armed forces. Although the Supreme Leader is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, he does not dispose of his responsibilities toward the defense establishment through any direct chain of command. According to the formal system, the Supreme Leader works through other bodies in exercising his control, as enumerated by constitutional reforms in 1989.

In the chain of command the next highest authority is the commander-in-chief of the army, followed by the commander in chief of the IRGC, the traditionalist Islamic force that has operated as an alternative army in Iran. The IRGC organization has its own independent chain of command and can operate either independently or in conjunction with the regular armed forces. The relationship between the two organizations has often been difficult but one of Rafsanjani's most significant achievements was to bring the IRGC into the formalized military command reporting structure.

Command and control problems           

The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war highlighted problems with Iranian command-and-control systems. If the regular army is to raise its effectiveness there must be a concerted attempt to ensure some commonality of systems. The existing multitude of both Western and ex-Soviet systems is a significant logistical, training and integration problem, which reduces the overall effectiveness of the force, and it will be difficult to raise standards while this situation prevails. This problem has been worsened recently because of Iran's purchases of Chinese systems as well. However, the greater propensity of Russian command-and-control systems has allowed better integration.

Despite these obstacles, army communications have improved, as have battle management and communications exercises. They are now capable of better co-ordination between branches, the density of communications equipment has improved, and the functional lines of communication and command now place more emphasis on maneuver, quick reaction and combined arms. However, Iranian battle management and communications capabilities seem to remain relatively limited. Iran's holdings still consist largely of ageing VHF radios with some HF and UHF capability. This equipment cannot handle high traffic densities and secure communications are poor. Iran still relies heavily on analogue data handling and manually switched telephone systems. It is, however, acquiring a steadily growing number of Chinese and Western encryption systems and some digital voice, fax, and telex encryption capability.

Chain of Command           

Chain of Command

Note: Personnel from the Ideological-Political Directorate (IPD) are to be found at all levels throughout the armed forces and have an independent reporting chain through the religious establishment to the Commander-in-Chief.

The Supreme National Security Council           

The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) chaired by the president but answerable to the Supreme Leader, is the key national defense and security assessment body. This forum discusses, calculates and formulates responses to threats to national security.

In addition, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the covert elements of the IRGC report to at least a subset of the SNSC, including the president, the Supreme Leader, and the Minister of Intelligence. These formal structures notwithstanding, it is important to underline the fact that the Supreme Leader exercises tremendous indirect control. The Supreme Leader relies on an elaborate system of interconnected directorships, whereby his representatives sit on decision-making bodies in various elements of the defense establishment. An estimated 2,000 Islamic 'commissars' work under the Supreme Leader's direction.

The members of the SNSC include the Chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces; the official heading of the Planning and Budget Organization; two representatives nominated by the Supreme Leader; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Intelligence, and the commanders of the Army and the IRGC.

Under the constitution, the SNSC is charged with guarding the Islamic Revolution and safeguarding Iran's national interests as well as its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Under Article 176 of the constitution, the SNSC has the following responsibilities:

To determine the national defense/security policies within the framework of general policies laid down by the Supreme Leader.

To co-ordinate political, intelligence, social, cultural and economic activities in relation to general defense/security policies.

To exploit material and non-material resources of the country for facing internal and external threats.

The SNSC operates sub-committees dealing with such matters as defense or national security. These sub-committees are headed by the president. Decisions of the SNSC become enforceable after they are ratified by the Supreme Leader.

Command appointments           

Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics: Ali Shamkhani
Head of ground forces: Brig Gen Naser Mohammadifar
IRGC commander: Gen Yahya Rahim-Safavi

Army organization           

The Iranian army has active forces of some 345,000 personnel, although a large percentage of this total are 18-month conscripts who generally receive limited training and have marginal military effectiveness. It also has an army reserve of some 350,000 personnel, although these reserves receive negligible training and Iran lacks the equipment, supplies and leadership cadres to make effective use of such resources without months of reorganization and training.

Despite the impressive number of personnel Iran's armed forces are not equipped with the latest technology and their performance in another major conflict is difficult to predict. The scale of Iran's rearmament programme - launched after its effective defeat in the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, when in the final phase of the conflict it lost 40 to 60 per cent of its armor and artillery - has often been exaggerated. Furthermore, much of the equipment that survived this war is becoming obsolete.

The army is organized into three army-level headquarters and 10 regular divisions, with independent groups including an airborne brigade, special forces and coastal defenses. There is at least one logistics brigade. The 23rd Commando (Special Forces) Division, formed in 1993-1994, is said to have 5,000 trained personnel, all of whom are believed to be regulars, marking an unusual move to full professionalism in an elite unit.

The regular armored divisions are sub-divided into three brigades. The acquisition of new Chinese, Polish and Ukrainian main battle tanks has allowed for this expansion of the armored forces. There are two brigades within the airborne forces and four special forces brigades within the division. The airborne and special forces are trained at a facility in Shiraz. Field artillery is divided into five regiment-sized groups, with surface-to-surface rockets and missiles under the command of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

During the 1990s there was a notable differentiation in mission between the country's primary security institutions the IRGC and the regular army. Despite severe economic problems, Iran will continue to maintain the two land force components. As economic conditions allow, the regular army will become more technologically based and more mobile, with an ability to sit well behind screen positions, rapidly reinforcing threatened areas where necessary.

The IRGC will focus on less traditional defense duties, particularly those that involve unusual missions or capabilities. These duties range from stopping smuggling and controlling Iran's missile forces, to preparing to close the Straits of Hormuz. In contrast, the army focuses its efforts on more traditional threats. To that end, the regular army will probably attempt to increase the size of the army aviation force, with an increased emphasis on attack and transport helicopters, both of which it is seeking to manufacture domestically.

Iranian Armored Division           

Iranian Armored Division

 

Iranian Mechanized Division           

Iranian Mechanized Division

 

Formation Designations           

23 Commando Division
28 Mechanized Division
84 Mechanized Division
18 Armored Division
81 Armored Division
88 Armored Division
30 Infantry Division
40 Infantry Division
58 Infantry Division
64 Infantry Division
77 Infantry Division
55 Parachute Division
23 Special Forces Division

Conscription           

Large-scale conscription is seen as wasteful and unnecessary during periods of economic downturn as experienced in 1998-2000. As the system probably could not cope with such numbers during peacetime, conscription is a selective process. Some conscripts are deployed with the army and others to civilian functions such as the construction industry, health care, teaching and village reconstruction.

The IRGC/Pasdaran           

The IRGC plays a major role in internal security. Nevertheless, it seems best to treat the IRGC primarily as a military land force which parallels the Iranian regular army, and which would operate with it in most contingencies. For example, the IRGC add some 120,000 additional men to Iran's forces. Roughly 100,000 are ground forces, including many conscripts. The IRGC has been placed under an integrated command with Iran's regular armed forces at the general staff level. It retains an independent command chain below this level, however, and generally continues to exercise as an independent force. It rarely exercises with the regular Iranian army - and then usually in large, set-piece exercises that do not require close co-operation.

Sources differ sharply on the organization of the IRGC, and its combat formations seem to be much smaller than the title implies, and to differ sharply from unit to unit. Some estimates point to strength of two armored, five mechanized, 10 infantry, and one special forces division, plus 15-20 independent brigades, including some armed and paratroop units. In practice, its manning would support three-five real divisions, and many of its divisions have an active strength equivalent to large brigades.

The IRGC, has its own ground, air and naval forces. Originally formed as a counterweight to the monarchist-orientated regular forces, it was initially subordinate to the ruling religious leaders. By 1986, it numbered over 300,000 personnel organized into battalion-sized units, with an independent chain of command and the capability of operating independently or in conjunction with regular units. Although its power and influence is much reduced, obvious friction remains between the regular forces and the IRGC.

During the 1990s there was a noticeable shift of emphasis from the IRGC in favor of the regular army. This can be traced back to the Iran-Iraq war when the IRGC provided the lightly armed manpower, which carried out the 'human wave' attacks on Iraqi positions. The appalling casualties suffered during these attacks had a severe impact on morale and, by 1988, it was becoming increasingly difficult to attract volunteers.

While the organization still retains control over a significant percentage of the population, numbers available for mobilization in an emergency are probably falling rapidly. The current manpower total of about 120,000 is significantly less than its wartime peak of over 750,000. However, the ability of the IRGC to assist in an emergency should not be underestimated. In 1988, at the height of Iran-Iraq War mobilization, IRGC forces provided 21 infantry divisions and over 50 independent brigades.

The IRGC's role remains important as another pillar of Iran's defensive capabilities. Most notably, the IRGC has been given a key role in the deployment of Iran's medium and long-range ballistic missiles. In July 2000, the IRGC stated that it had formed five new ballistic missile units, apparently to be equipped with the Shahab 3 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which reportedly has a range of 1,300 km. In July 2003 it was reported that the Shahab 3 had now entered service with the IRGC. The decision to put such strategic weaponry under the operational control of the IRGC underlines the degree of trust placed by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, in the organization.

IRGC basis units are usually of battalion-size, organized into brigades and divisions, and although some units are in possession of specialized weapons, most are lightly armed and not capable of sustained operations. In the late 1990s, the IRGC was re-equipped with the Iranian-built Boraq tracked armored personnel carrier.

New uniforms have been introduced, together with a system of military ranks divided into four categories - soldiers, fighters, officers and commandants. In all, some 21 ranks were introduced in September 1991 which, with six exceptions, parallel those of the regular forces. Military training standards have also been raised. Few details are available but training is believed to be identical to that undertaken in the regular army.

In addition to a military mission in supporting the regular forces when required and law enforcement responsibilities, the IRGC also has a cultural role in safeguarding the achievements of the Islamic Revolution.

During 1998, after the restructuring and with a total strength of approximately 120,000, Pasdaran formations were as follows:

Regional Headquarters	× 11 (fully manned)
Armored Divisions	× 2 (on mobilization)
Infantry Divisions	× 24 (cadre strength)

IRGC/Pasdaran Chain of Command           

IRGC/Pasdaran Chain of Command

 

The IRGC is increasingly engaged in internal security operations, which includes local intelligence gathering. This role has grown in importance since the end of the war with Iraq. It has also been in the forefront of the national reconstruction drive, providing labor for infrastructure projects where appropriate. Co-operation between the IRGC, the National Police and the Gendarmerie at this level is believed to be extensive. Patrols often operate on a freelance basis with the Gendarmerie, Highway Police and other civilian organizations. IRGC forces often man the internal customs posts found about 10 km outside each major city or conurbation.

The Guards Special Qods Force is a secret military organization, under the command of the Pasdaran, which allegedly controls all external terrorist activity. Its commander is Guards Brigadier-General Vahidi who has subordinates in Lebanon. As circumstances become more settled, overall numbers in the Pasdaran will probably fall to around 100,000 but settled conditions may well mean that a higher state of training and readiness can be achieved.

A situation in which there are, in effect, two armies in one country may be politically desirable but operationally it represents a potential disaster, probably reducing the overall effectiveness of the total force by a significant degree. Certainly such a situation can only be a bonus for Iran's neighbors. It constitutes a potentially fatal flaw in the land forces' overall posture.

Basij           

Part of the IRGC, the Basij (Mobilization of the Oppressed) is a popular reserve force of about 90,000 personnel with an active and reserve strength of up to 300,000 and a mobilization capacity of nearly 1,000,000 personnel. This volunteer force would provide the bulk of the land forces personnel in the event of mobilization. It has up to 740 regional battalions with about 300-350 personnel each, which are composed of three companies or four platoons plus support. These include the former tribal levies and are largely regional in character. Many have little or no real military training and active full time manning.

The Basij provides the war casualty reserve and, in peacetime, military training and organization for all civilians. However, Iran has used the Basij to provide local security ever since the popular riots of 1994. Since that time, it has begun began far more extensive training for riot control and internal security missions. It also introduced a formal rank structure, and a more conventional system of command and discipline, and created specialized 'Ashura' battalions for internal security missions. The primary mission of the Basij now seems to be internal security, monitoring the activities of Iranian citizens, acting as replacements for the military services, and serving as a static militia force tied to local defense missions.

There were indications during 2001 that the Basij were receiving additional training and equipment, with a view to cracking down on internal unrest, especially among students in the universities. It was also learned that Basij forces were deployed along the sensitive frontiers with Afghanistan and Pakistan - possibly with a view to bolstering border security following the Coalition's 'Enduring Freedom' offensive against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Basij forces, which include women, have been holding major military exercises to improve their ability to react swiftly in emergencies.

The role of the Basij seems reserved for internal security. Perhaps it is for political reasons that the Basij is allowed to participate in military exercises, as its military role remains minimal.

Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine           

It is normal practice for each Iranian armored brigade to have three battalions, each with approximately 55 tanks. There is evidence that the Iranians try to keep tanks of one type in a brigade. Some reports suggest that two armored divisions in Western Command have four brigades but this is unconfirmed. For specific operations, the armored brigade can be regrouped and its three armored battalions attached to each of the mechanized brigades.

The mechanized brigade will generally have three battalions equipped with armored personnel carriers (usually BTR series). During the Iran-Iraq War some mechanized brigades had at least one battalion of lorried infantry. An Iranian infantry division will almost certainly be trucked and could use local civilian transport resources.

Since 2001, Tehran has been negotiating with Russia over the purchase of the S-300 air defense system. The Almaz S-300PMU is considered the best Russian air defense missile available, equal to the US army's Patriot, and can destroy any current Western fighter aircraft. Recently, Russia introduced the S-400 into its own military. There is speculation that Iran is also attempting to import the latest in Russian air defense systems.

It has become apparent to the military leadership that Iran has less than a quarter of the self-propelled artillery it needs to properly support its present force structure, and that maneuverable artillery is critical to success in dealing with Iraqi and other maneuver forces. It is attempting to compensate for the resulting lack of modern artillery and artillery mobility by replacing its US self-propelled weapons with other self-propelled systems. Iran has purchased 60-80 Soviet 2S1 122 mm self-propelled howitzers, and has developed Iranian-made designs called the Raad (Thunder )1 and Raad (Thunder 2). The Raad-1 is a 122 mm weapon similar to Russian designs. The Raad-2 is a 'rapid fire' 155 mm self-propelled weapon. Both systems are apparently now in deployment.

Experience with captured Soviet-designed helicopters during the war with Iraq, including Mil Mi-8 and Mi-17 medium-lift support helicopters, showed them to be capable performers in the roles for which Iran has a need.

It was understood in early 2001 that in addition to agreeing to sell military equipment to Iran, Russia also agreed to provide training to Iranian personnel in Russian military schools, where the Iranians would learn not only how to operate Russian equipment but also Russian tactics. As a result, it was expected that, Iranian military doctrine would increasingly reflect Russian norms.

Recent military exercises

In the third phase of the Peyrovan-e Velayat (Followers of the Guardian Jurisconsult) war games in late November 2004, Army Aviation (Havaniruz) bombers practised against enemy attacks from the western and southern parts of the country. Army Aviation helicopters - the largest helicopter fleet in the Middle East - attacked the infrastructure positions and advancing columns of a hypothetical enemy with their Cobra helicopters in dozens of flight sorties. At this stage, the defense units of the Army Aviation and its anti-aircraft missiles adopted impromptu and varying military tactics, based on the performance of the hypothetical enemy. Jet fighters and army aviation tracking aircraft (Havapeymay-e rahgir) also offered air support in order to accomplish the mission and stop the hypothetical enemy's aircraft from carrying out its missions.

The Army's rapid-reaction units were heli-borne to different points of the expansive exercise area with Chinook and 214 helicopters of the Army Aviation units. The helicopters were in special formations armed with light weaponry, allegedly manufactured in Iran. On display were new military tactics integrating helicopter-based assaults in tandem with infantry surges and artillery support. The increasing reliance on the army's helicopter forces suggests a growing reliance on rapid reaction capabilities. Iran pioneered the use of army aviation and attack helicopters during the time of the Shah, but built up its holdings of helicopters far more quickly than it expanded its training and maintenance capability.

In July 2004, during the final phase of the large-scale Tondar-5 military exercises in Dasht-e Abbas and Fakkeh, operations involving aerial movements and transport of rapid deployment forces were carried out. Chinook helicopters belonging to Havaniruz and various military equipment and light and heavy arms were used. They were used within the framework of a real combat situation. Moreover, offensive operations were planned during which Havaniruz firing teams, which were using Cobra fighter helicopters, destroyed the material and equipment belonging to a hypothetical enemy in order to provide support to commando forces.

Recently, the Havaniruz has developed more than 30 simulators for training pilots of the AB-205A and AB-206 model of helicopters. Research into designing these simulators began in 1997-1998. Iran's army ground force commander, Brig. Gen. Naser Mohammadi-Far, noted that the new training process (via simulators) would expedite training and minimize costs.

The increasing emphasis on the Army's aviation assets has been attributed to the appointment of Brigadier-Second Pilot K. Ahadi as the new commander of the aviation centre of the Army of Iran. During his induction ceremony, Ahadi commented: "The military and flight readiness and awareness of the aviation forces is not dependent on a special time or place. The circumstances of the region and the world demand that we think about increasing the Army's aviation capabilities during peacetime."

Army Bases           

There are numerous small detachments of troops across Iran and the trend will be for further deployments if the internal situation worsens. The main bases are:

Abadan
Agha Jari
Ahvaz
Bushehr
Chah Bahar
Dezful
Hamadan
Isfahan
Khorramshahr
Mahabad
Shiraz
Tehran
Zahedan

Army aviation units are based at Isfahan, Mashhad and Tehran/Mehrabad, as well as at many desert strips, especially when engaged in exercises or training.

Army Bases

 

Garrisons           

There are garrisons at:

Abadan
Bandar Abbas
Isfahan
Mahabad
Mashhad
Tabriz

Training           

Officers are trained at the Tehran Military Academy. Specialist courses are taught at Shiraz (infantry and armor), Tabriz (signals) and Isfahan (missiles and army aviation). Airborne and special forces are trained at Shiraz.

In the early 1990s, Iranian land forces were seen as inadequate in terms of conducting effective armored maneuvers or combined arms operations. This problem has been addressed with regular major military exercises being carried out in the late 1990s. In the latter part of 1997, for instance, the two-week 'Zulfiqar' maneuvers involved 200,000 military personnel, many heavy weapons and a significant part of the air force's operational strength. The exercises stretched from the Kush-e-Nosrat desert south of Tehran to the southern coastline of the Gulf.

The Iranian doctrine of asymmetric warfare aimed at countering a threat from a much larger and more powerful adversary was demonstrated during the large-scale military exercises dubbed 'Ashura 5' that were held during September 2004. "The principles of this kind of warfare have been formulated in view of extra-regional threats which we assume the Islamic Republic will face, "IRGC commander General Yahya Rahim-Safavi told Iranian state television. The exercise corresponded with International Atomic Energy Agency discussions on the Iranian nuclear programme and was described by Iranian officials as "an attempt to bolster deterrence against any Israeli or US military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities".

Some 12 mechanized divisions were reported to have participated in the maneuvers, which were held under the aegis of the IRGC, in the western provinces of Hamedan, Kurdistan and Zanjan. The exercise included units from the IRGC, regular army and air force as well as Basij volunteer units. During the exercise, Iran reportedly tested defensive tactics, military platforms, the effectiveness of co-ordinated air and ground strikes, psychological warfare and logistics such as the airlift of the T-72 main battle tank. Iran also launched a "strategic surface-to-surface missile" during 'Ashura 5', according to the Iranian News Agency.

Procurement           

Land Forces Requirements           

Armour

Iran's main concern has been to build up its heavy armor capabilities. It has been doing this, in part, by importing T-72 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) from Russia, Poland, and Ukraine. This has complemented the domestic T-72 production line (opened in 1997) and the indigenous Zulfiquar MBT programme, a tank similar to the now-defunct Brazilian ENGESA Osorio but with suspension similar to that of the 105 mm armed M60 MBT in Iranian service since the 1970s. Iran has also developed another upgraded version of the T-54 called the Safir-74, which has explosive reactive armor for high protection against kinetic- and chemical-energy attack. This is armed with a Western-type 105 mm rifled tank gun. In addition, the Islamic Republic of Iran's army ground force commander, Brigadier-General Naser Mohammadi-Far, noted that Iranian tanks were being equipped with laser firing systems and that army experts are equipping Chieftain Tanks, T-72 Tanks and M-60 Tanks with laser firing control systems. The artillery equipment of the army will also be equipped with electronically controlled guided-fire systems.

Iran has also been re-equipping its mechanized forces. A BMP-2 armored infantry fighting vehicle production line has been established, constructing kits imported from Russia. Iran is producing an armored fighting vehicle called the Boragh and a lighter APC called the Cobra or BMT-2, and some 120 may be in service. The Boragh seems to be a copy of a Chinese version of the BMP-1.

Artillery

The army has a requirement for Self-Propelled Howitzers (SPHs), and it is expected that at least some of this requirement will be met by home-produced weapons. In December 1997 Iran unveiled two indigenous new full-tracked SPHs, the 122 mm Thunder-1 and the 155 mm Thunder-2. Iran has some 3,000-3,200 operational medium and heavy artillery weapons and multiple rocket launchers. This total is very high by regional standards, and reflects the continuing buildup of artillery strength that began during the Iran-Iraq War.

Anti-tank missiles

Among the projects that have been tackled by Iran's Defense Industries Organization has been the development of the Raad-1 anti-tank guided missile, based on the 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 'Sagger') system of the early 1960s. In February 2002 a senior Iranian army commander announced that Iran had successfully tested a new TOW-type anti-tank missile.

Other variants of the Boragh APC recently developed include a 120 mm armored mortar carrier, armored ammunition carrier and an anti-tank vehicle armed with the locally manufactured Toophan ATGW, which looks like the US Raytheon Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided missile (TOW). Boragh components are also used in the Raad-1 122 mm self-propelled artillery system that is already in service. Iran also makes a copy of the Russian AT-3 (Sagger) anti-tank guided missile.

Surface-to-surface missiles

Iran has an arsenal of short-range, liquid-fueled missiles including the Scud B and Scud C. Iran is now able to produce Scud-type missiles on its own, thanks to assistance provided by North Korea. The Aerospace Industries Organization, a subsidiary of Iran's Ministry of Defense, claims to support the manufacturing process by engaging in "Scud missile restoration". Iran's short-range missile inventory also includes solid-fueled missiles, such as the Chinese-made CSS-8 (also called the Tondar-69) and the Fateh A-110. Iran claims to have successfully flight tested the Fateh A-110 in September 2002. It is reportedly a single-stage missile with at least a 200 km range. Iran's Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics claims that Iran produced the missile domestically. In addition, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the head of Iran's Expediency Council, has asserted that Iran produced the solid fuel propellant for the missile. The Aerospace Industries Organization claims to be capable of producing "many types of liquid and solid propellant." According to an Iranian media report, the Aerospace Industries Organization opened a plant to mass produce the Fateh A-110 in mid-September 2002.

Iran is also working to expand the reach of the medium-range rocket, the Shahab-3, currently capable of traveling some 1,300 km, to in excess of 1,600 km. The upgrades are intended as a substitute for Iran's development of the longer-range Shahab-4 missile, which the Islamic Republic announced it was abandoning in November 2003.

In the area of anti-armor missiles, military officials claim that the Aerospace Industries Organization could manufacture weapons that can penetrate the second generation of explosive reactive armor. (Reactive armor can explode back at the shell as it explodes against the armor; many Western, Russian, and Israeli tanks use reactive armor.)

In February 2005, Ukraine announced that criminal elements in the country had illegally exported over a dozen Kh-55 land-attack cruise missiles to Iran and China. The Kh-55 cruise missile, NATO designation AS-15 "Kent," was the Soviet Union's response to the first generation of modern US cruise missiles - the General Dynamic "